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June 05, 2008

Tanto los usuarios como las empresas consiguen sus objetivos en eBay. Un usuario que entra en eBay quiere cambiar de vida, hacer lo que le gusta, conseguir sus sueños. Y para ello necesita comprar algo al mejor precio posible, así que eBay es la mejor opción, y a la vez será recordada y recomendada en ocasiones posteriores. Y un millón de personas que cambian su vida a mejor es la mayor ola de generación de red que se pueda desear.

Pero ante todo, eBay es una red, que no deja de crecer y cuyo núcleo son profesionales de las ventas en subasta que han hecho en eBay sus negocios. Por lo que también hay miles de empresas que tienen a eBay como herramienta de negocio.

A raíz de esto, eBay ha podido desarrollar su propio software, su pasarela de pago (PayPal) y otras herramientas de pago, porque sabe que sus usuarios ya no van a tener inconveniente en pagarlo.

eBay entendió pronto que en la economía de redes, sólo crecen las empresas que generan también un crecimiento entre sus miembros.

En la red, piense primero en sus clientes: su propio éxito depende de ello.

Há alguns dias não entrava no site da Anatel. Hoje vi que o Presidente da entidade (Embaixador Ronaldo Sardenberg, ex-Ministro da Ciência e Tecnologia entre os anos 1999 e 2002, e que tive a honra de poder trabalhar em conjunto, enquanto fui Presidente do Fórum Nacional das Entidades de Fomento à Pesquisa do Brasil), fez recentemente um importante desafio aos agentes do mercado das telecomunicações. 

Em palestra proferida na manhã do dia 02/10/2007, no Futurecom, em Florianópolis (SC), o Embaixador Ronaldo Sardenberg, lançou um desafio às instituições que atuam no setor para reforçar a presença brasileira em todas as atividades centrais do panorama das telecomunicações: avançar em pesquisa e desenvolvimento de modo a garantir condições de conhecer e de assimilar os avanços tecnológicos, a fim de adequá-los às especificidades brasileiras.

Segundo o Embaixador, o governo, as universidades e a iniciativa privada devem agregar esforços para estimular as pesquisas e o desenvolvimento, no Brasil, de soluções tecnológicas inovadoras voltadas às necessidades e às condições da população. "É necessário garantir que o desenvolvimento tecnológico esteja diretamente destinado ao benefício social de seus resultados", disse, ao lembrar o incremento na qualidade de vida da população como resultado dos esforços em pesquisa e desenvolvimento.

Outro ponto abordado pelo Embaixador Sardenberg foi a peculiaridade de a convergência (grifos nossos!) promover a verticalização entre as corporações, elevando o risco de monopólio, e de outro lado, levar a um tipo de fragmentação, com o surgimento de pequenas empresas prestadoras de serviços, com possibilidade de rupturas tecnológicas. Segundo ele, cada vez mais as operadoras de telecomunicações terão capacidade de banda para transmitir, distribuir e difundir qualquer tipo de conteúdo, ao mesmo tempo em que os radiodifusores terão possibilidade de usar as faixas de freqüências a eles consignadas para prestar serviços de telecomunicações. Para ele, uma nova lei de comunicação (grifos nossos!) deveria encontrar uma solução harmônica que preservasse e fomentasse a produção de conteúdo nacional ao mesmo tempo em que estimulasse a distribuição e a difusão de conteúdo por todos os meios, com ganhos para todos os agentes envolvidos e, principalmente, para os usuários.

Esperemos que os brasileiros, e os nossos representantes no Congresso, entendam a urgência desta nova lei de comunicação!  Valeu Embaixador! Vejo que o Senhor está dando um novo caráter à ANATEL, e uma outra importante contribuição ao país!

Quer saber quais são as 100 maiores buscas do Wikipedia?  Você vai achar estranho, mas as redes sociais são assim mesmo!  Divirta-se acessando aqui! 

Apesar de sites de redes sociais como MySpace e Facebook parecerem sucessos nos EUA, a ação real está acontecendo em outros países. Na Coréia do Sul, por exemplo, mais da metade dos usuários de Internet acessaram um site de redes sociais nos últimos 30 dias.  Os EUA não estão nem perto disto; de fato, os americanos estão num longe quinto lugar, de acordo com uma pequisa, que você pode acessar aqui.  Brasil, China e México estão no topo!

Continuando a série sobre economia globalizada dos objetos da tecnologia contemporânea (o primeiro foi o iPod, no post do dia 01/07), hoje trazemos algo (que saiu na Businessweek)  sobre o que está por trás da fabricação do iPhone.  Mais uma vez lamentamos mas a matéria (reproduzida abaixo) está em inglês!

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Businessweek, Technology July 2, 2007, 12:00AM EST

Taking the iPhone Apart
An analysis from teardown firm Portelligent estimates that the new smartphone costs Apple a mere $220 to make

by Arik Hesseldahl

As the creator of the iPhone, the most highly anticipated piece of consumer-electronics equipment in a decade or more, Apple (AAPL) certainly has much riding on the device's success. So too, in turn, do Apple's many, mostly anonymous suppliers.

Apple, always secretive and tight-lipped about its supply-chain and manufacturing arrangements, almost never says anything in public about its suppliers, not even to disclose names. The exceptions are Intel (INTC), the chipmaker that supplies the microprocessors for Apple's Macintosh computers, and NVIDA (NVDA) and ATI (AMD), which supply the graphics chips for those same computers.

So it's left to teardown firms such as Austin-based Portelligent, to sleuth out not only who supplies all the parts but what it costs to make a device. And David Carey, Portelligent's CEO, did something that few others in the country did after buying an iPhone: He took it apart.

A Hearty Margin

Portelligent estimates that the cost of the materials used in the iPhone add up to about $200 for the 4-gigabyte version, which sells for $499 and about $220 for the 8-gigabyte version, which sells for $599. Their estimate doesn't include costs of final assembly, but it does give some insight into the gross margin on the device. Historically Apple's gross margins have run ball park of 50% plus or minus a few points. "We had taken a speculative stab at what the costs would be back in January, when the phone was first announced and we were pretty close to the mark," Carey says (see BusinessWeek.com, 9/20/06, "The Skinny on Apple's New nanos").

The most expensive component on the phone, Carey says, is the touch screen, for which Apple tapped a little-known German concern called Balda (see BusinessWeek.com, 4/5/07, "Balda: The iPhone's German Accent"). The estimated cost of $60 per unit is mostly an educated guess. "This screen is like nothing I've ever seen before," says Carey.

Even the fact that Balda made it, is in fact, an educated guess. Carey told BusinessWeek that his analysis found no apparent markings that identified the screen's origin. But Balda's role in the screen has been something of an open secret in the wireless industry since the iPhone was first announced by Apple CEO Steve Jobs in January. Even so, Apple apparently took steps to make the source of the screen hard to identity.

How the Chips Fall

Another big winner is Samsung, which supplied the main microprocessor chip. It was stamped with an Apple logo, but with a serial number that matches closely a chip that Samsung sells. Samsung also supplied the NAND-type flash memory that stores data on the phone, including songs, video, and pictures.

Samsung's microprocessor chip, interestingly, is based on a core design that is owned by the British chip technology licensing firm ARM Holdings (ARMHY), which is another big winner among the iPhone suppliers. Instead of selling chips, ARM licenses its patented designs for "cores," or the central working brain of a chip. Customers take those core designs and then build their own chips around them. At least one other ARM-based chip, from NXP Semiconductor, the former chip division of Royal Philips Electronics (PHG), shows up in the iPhone. Other chips might have some ARM technology on them as well, Carey says.

Apple recently announced that it had improved the talk time on the iPhone's battery to eight hours. At least some of this improvement was accomplished by paying close attention to power management. Three chips are involved in that function: one from Philips, one from Texas Instruments (TXN), and one from Linear Technology (LLTC).

Handling various aspects of the wireless communications on the iPhone, from connection of AT&T's (T) wireless voice and data network to local Wi-Fi networks, are components from Infineon (IFX), Skyworks (SWKS), RF Micro Devices (RFMD), and Marvell Technology Group (MRVL). Cambridge Silicon Radio supplied chips that connect the iPhone to wireless headsets.

An accelerometer—a chip that senses motion—from STMicroelectronics (STM) helps the iPhone sense when its orientation has changed, which causes the orientation of pictures and video being displayed on the screen to change accordingly. Also handling various aspects of the display are chips from National Semiconductor (NSM), Broadcom (BRCM), and NXP. Idaho-based Micron Technology (MU) supplied the imaging chip that is central to the camera.

Mysterious Maker

Carey points out that the chip-packed iPhone offers "a very calm and serene user experience" that belies its internal complexity. "A great deal went into the internal mechanics and how it all came together," he observes. "There are lots of tiny nooks and crannies where things have to be very precisely tucked in to make it all fit together."

The complex design calls for equally complex manufacturing, which dictated that the iPhone be made outside of the U.S. "You have to build something like this in a place where labor is inexpensive," says Carey, which in this case means China. But Carey says it's unclear who manufactured the iPhone: "There are no markings indicating exactly who built it."

Apple's iPods have been built by Hon Hai Precision Industry and its Foxconn operating unit. BusinessWeek reported in January that Hon Hai had won the contract to manufacture the iPhone (see BusinessWeek.com, 1/10/07, "Apple iPhone: Sweet Ring Tone for Hon Hai"). But last month Samuel Chin, CEO of Foxconn, told investors that the company would not be making the iPhone. "Previous devices that Foxconn had made for Apple had their markings stamped all over the place," Carey says. "We just don't know who's making this one yet."

Apple had come under fire in 2006 for doing business with Hon Hai after allegations emerged in a British newspaper that its employees worked under sweatshop conditions (see BusinessWeek.com, 6/29/06, "Fixing Apple's 'Sweatshop' Woes"). Subsequent Apple investigations found some problems that it insisted be fixed and were fixed (see BusinessWeek.com, 8/21/06, "Hon Hai: Vindicated by Apple Report?").

Hesseldahl is a reporter for BusinessWeek.com.

Um dos mais renomados economistas dos EUA, Prof. Hal Varian, da Universidade da Califórnia, em Berkeley, que tenho grande admiração, tem uma coluna no New York Times que é muito lida e referenciada.  Neste último dia 28/06 sua coluna foi dedicada ao iPod. 

Vejam só, abaixo, o que ele escreveu (lamento, mas o texto é em inglês!), e comprovem o que é globalização da tecnologia nos tempos de hoje!

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June 28, 2007

Economic Scene

An iPod Has Global Value. Ask the (Many) Countries That Make It.

By HAL R. VARIAN

Who makes the Apple iPod? Here’s a hint: It is not Apple. The company outsources the entire manufacture of the device to a number of Asian enterprises, among them Asustek, Inventec Appliances and Foxconn.

But this list of companies isn’t a satisfactory answer either: They only do final assembly. What about the 451 parts that go into the iPod? Where are they made and by whom?

Three researchers at the University of California, Irvine — Greg Linden, Kenneth L. Kraemer and Jason Dedrick — applied some investigative cost accounting to this question, using a report from Portelligent Inc. that examined all the parts that went into the iPod.

Their study, sponsored by the Sloan Foundation, offers a fascinating illustration of the complexity of the global economy, and how difficult it is to understand that complexity by using only conventional trade statistics.

The retail value of the 30-gigabyte video iPod that the authors examined was $299. The most expensive component in it was the hard drive, which was manufactured by Toshiba and costs about $73. The next most costly components were the display module (about $20), the video/multimedia processor chip ($8) and the controller chip ($5). They estimated that the final assembly, done in China, cost only about $4 a unit.

One approach to tracing supply chain geography might be to attribute the cost of each component to the country of origin of its maker. So $73 of the cost of the iPod would be attributed to Japan since Toshiba is a Japanese company, and the $13 cost of the two chips would be attributed to the United States, since the suppliers, Broadcom and PortalPlayer, are American companies, and so on.

But this method hides some of the most important details. Toshiba may be a Japanese company, but it makes most of its hard drives in the Philippines and China. So perhaps we should also allocate part of the cost of that hard drive to one of those countries. The same problem arises regarding the Broadcom chips, with most of them manufactured in Taiwan. So how can one distribute the costs of the iPod components across the countries where they are manufactured in a meaningful way?

To answer this question, let us look at the production process as a sequence of steps, each possibly performed by a different company operating in a different country. At each step, inputs like computer chips and a bare circuit board are converted into outputs like an assembled circuit board. The difference between the cost of the inputs and the value of the outputs is the “value added” at that step, which can then be attributed to the country where that value was added.

The profit margin on generic parts like nuts and bolts is very low, since these items are produced in intensely competitive industries and can be manufactured anywhere. Hence, they add little to the final value of the iPod. More specialized parts, like the hard drives and controller chips, have much higher value added.

According to the authors’ estimates, the $73 Toshiba hard drive in the iPod contains about $54 in parts and labor. So the value that Toshiba added to the hard drive was $19 plus its own direct labor costs. This $19 is attributed to Japan since Toshiba is a Japanese company.

Continuing in this way, the researchers examined the major components of the iPod and tried to calculate the value added at different stages of the production process and then assigned that value added to the country where the value was created. This isn’t an easy task, but even based on their initial examination, it is quite clear that the largest share of the value added in the iPod goes to enterprises in the United States, particularly for units sold here.

The researchers estimated that $163 of the iPod’s $299 retail value in the United States was captured by American companies and workers, breaking it down to $75 for distribution and retail costs, $80 to Apple, and $8 to various domestic component makers. Japan contributed about $26 to the value added (mostly via the Toshiba disk drive), while Korea contributed less than $1.

The unaccounted-for parts and labor costs involved in making the iPod came to about $110. The authors hope to assign those labor costs to the appropriate countries, but as the hard drive example illustrates, that’s not so easy to do.

This value added calculation illustrates the futility of summarizing such a complex manufacturing process by using conventional trade statistics. Even though Chinese workers contribute only about 1 percent of the value of the iPod, the export of a finished iPod to the United States directly contributes about $150 to our bilateral trade deficit with the Chinese.

Ultimately, there is no simple answer to who makes the iPod or where it is made. The iPod, like many other products, is made in several countries by dozens of companies, with each stage of production contributing a different amount to the final value.

The real value of the iPod doesn’t lie in its parts or even in putting those parts together. The bulk of the iPod’s value is in the conception and design of the iPod. That is why Apple gets $80 for each of these video iPods it sells, which is by far the largest piece of value added in the entire supply chain.

Those clever folks at Apple figured out how to combine 451 mostly generic parts into a valuable product. They may not make the iPod, but they created it. In the end, that’s what really matters.

Hal R. Varian is a professor of business, economics and information management at the University of California, Berkeley.